Constitutional Law and the Politics of Ethnic Accommodation : Institutional Design in Afghanistan (Paperback)

Identifying the Problem

The Search for an Explanation

A Way to Explore

Establishing the Parameters: Ethnic Accommodation

Organization of This Book

Introduction

I. What Afghanistanologists Had to Say About Afghanistan

II. Were Afghans Anti- Democratic?

III. How Divided was Afghanistan as a Country and a Nation?

What did the Elites Say?

IV. A Socially Divorced Constitution

Conclusion

Introduction

I. Feature One: The 50 Percent Threshold

II. Feature Two: The Disastrous Second Rounds

III. Nonconcurrent Electoral Cycles

Conclusion

Introduction

I. The Nuts and Bolts of the SNTV System

A. Feature One: Proportional Representation

B. Feature Two: Encouraging Personalistic Politics

C. Feature Three: Threshold- Free Elections

D. Feature Four: Encouraging the Fragmentation of Parties and Coalition

Conclusion

Introduction

I. A Look at the Balance of Powers from Above

II. Legislative Powers of the President

1. Legislative Initiations

2. Veto Authority of the President

3. Soliciting Constitutional Review

4. Decree Authority of the President

5. Budget Planning

III. Executive Powers of the President vis-a-vis the House

1. Cabinet Formation

2. Endurance of Cabinet Members in Afghanistan

3. Changes in Administrative Units

IV. Senate: The Backyard of the President

Conclusion

Introduction

I. Dual Vice-Presidency and its Representational Attributes

II. Policy- Free Presidential Teams

III. The Irrelevant Vice- Presidents

Conclusion

I. The Problem of Outsider Governors

II. Local Councils (Provincial, District, and Village)

Conclusion

Introduction

I. Lack of Interest in Party Development

II. Command and Control Rules

III. Laws of Not the Emerging Coalitions

Conclusion

Appendix