Designing Federalism : A Theory of Self-Sustainable Federal Institutions (Hardcover)

1. Federations and the theoretical problem: 1.1 Why Federalism; 1.2 Definitions; 1.3 The long search for stability; Federalism as nuisance; Federalism as engine of prosperity; Riker as intermediary; 1.4 The fundamental problem of stability; 1.5 Basic premises and conclusions; 2. Federal bargaining: 2.1 Alliances versus federations; 2.2 The private character of public goods; 2.3 Equilibrium selection and redistribution; 2.4 The 'federal problem'; 2.5 Bargaining for control of the center; 2.6 Allocating jurisdictions; 2.7 Three levels of institutional design; 3. Two cases of uninstitutionalized bargaining: 3.1 The Czechoslovak dissolution; 3.2 The Soviet dissolution; 3.3 The feasibility of success in initial bargaining; 3.4 Secession: the special road to renegotiation; 4. Representation: 4.1 Two alternative models of Federalism; 4.2 A national venue for bargaining; 4.3 Within versus without; 4.4 Direct versus delegated representation; 4.5 Other parameters of design; 4.6 Bilateral decision making and the case of Russia; 5. Incentives: 5.1 Institutional enforcement; 5.2 The court; 5.3 Some simple rules of constitutional design; 5.4 Voters versus elites; 5.5 Desirable imperfection and a democratic as if principle; 6. Political parties in a federal state: 6.1 An extreme hypothesis; 6.2 Parties in a democracy; 6.3 The idealized party system; 6.4 Integrated parties; 6.5 Integration outside the United States; Australian Federalism and the role of parties; Canada; 6.6 India; Leadership incentives; Rank and file incentives; The party and Federalism; 1967 and thereafter; 7. Institutional sources of federal stability I: 7.1 Introduction; 7.2 Level 2 and the federalist; 7.3 Level 3 institutions; 7.4 Australia, Canada, Germany, and India revisited; Germany; Canada; Canada vs Australia and India; 7.3 Local and regional design parameters; 8. Institutional sources of federal stability II: 8.1 Electoral mechanisms and societal structures; Representation; Ethnicity; Defining federal subjects; Number of local jurisdictions; Authority over local governments; 8.2 Bicameralism; Symmetry; Presidential authority; Presidential selection; Electoral connections; 8.3 Level 1 and the scope of the federal mandate; 8.4 Level 0 - things beyond design; 9. Designing Federalism: 9.1 Russia; Electoral arrangements; Regional autonomy; Constitutional matters; Parties and the current status quo; 9.2 The European Union; Background; The role of parties; The puzzle of the collusion; France versus Britain; EU institutional design; 9.4 Conclusion.