Microeconomic Foundations II: Imperfect Competition, Information, and Strategic Interaction

책 이미지

eBook 미리보기

책 정보

· 제목 : Microeconomic Foundations II: Imperfect Competition, Information, and Strategic Interaction (Hardcover)
· 분류 : 외국도서 > 경제경영 > 경제학/경제일반 > 미시경제학
· ISBN : 9780691250144
· 쪽수 : 800쪽
· 출판일 : 2023-05-23

Chapter Nineteen. Moral Hazard and Incentives
- 19.1. A Very Simple Model
- 19.2. A Somewhat General Model
- 19.3. Back to Effort Incentives
- 19.4. A Continuum of Actions and the First-order Approach
- 19.5. Linear Incentive Schemes
- 19.6. Linear Incentives? Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987)
- 19.7. Is Risk Aversion the Key to Agency Issues?
- Bibliographic Notes
- Problems

Chapter Twenty. Private Information Part I: One-shot Interactions
- 20.1. Adverse Selection: Akerlof’s Market for Lemons
- 20.2. Akerlof Meets Game Theory: One Seller
- 20.3. Adverse Selection in Other Contexts
- 20.4. A Toy Model of Adverse Selection in Insurance
- 20.5. Screening as an Economic Concept
- 20.6. Single Crossing
- 20.7. Insurance with Two Types
- 20.8. Signaling: Spence’s Job Market
- 20.9. Cheap Talk
- Bibliographic Notes
- Problems

Chapter Twenty-One. Private Information Part II: An Introduction to Dynamics
- 21.1. Analysis of the Coase Conjecture in the Textbook Model
- 21.2. When Does the Coase Conjecture Hold?
- 21.3. (How) Can the Monopolist Escape the Coase-Conjecture Trap?
- 21.4. Other Contexts
- Bibliographic Notes
- Problems

Chapter Twenty-Two. Credibility: Reciprocity and Reputation
- 22.1. Oligopoly and Implicit Collusion
- 22.2. Entry Deterrence and Predation: The Chain-Store Paradox
- 22.3. Relational Contracting
- Bibliographic Notes
- Problems

Chapter Twenty-Three. Bilateral Bargaining
- 23.1. One-Sided Bargaining
- 23.2. The Two-Sided Demand Game
- 23.3. Rubinstein’s Alternating-Offer Game
- 23.4. Alice and Bob Negotiate Where to Eat Dinner
- 23.5. Abreu and Gul (2000); A War of Attrition with Incomplete Information
- 23.6. The “Most Natural” Context with Private Information and Simultaneous Bid and Ask
- 23.7. The Most Natural Context and Dynamic Bargaining
- 23.8. Axiomatic Approaches: The Nash Bargaining Solution
- Bibliographic Notes
- Problems

Chapter Twenty-Four. Auctions
- 24.1. A Typology: Context and Protocol
- 24.2. Private Values
- 24.3. Common-Value Contexts: Preliminaries
- 24.4. Symmetric Equilibria in the Wallet-Game Context
- 24.5. The Drainage-Tract Context (a.k.a. Maxco–Gambit)
- 24.6. Conditionally Independent Signals
- 24.7. Multi-Item Auctions
- 24.8. Why Do We (Think We) Know More about Auctions Than about Bilateral Bargaining?
- Bibliographic Notes
- Problems

Chapter Twenty-Five. Matching Markets
- 25.1. Contexts
- 25.2. The Classic Marriage Market
- 25.3. The Lattice Structure of Stable Matches
- 25.4. Many-to-One Matches: The College-Admissions and Job-Assignment Models
- 25.5. Salaries and Other Terms and Conditions
- 25.6. Strategic Considerations
- Bibilographic Notes
- Problems

Chapter Twenty-Six. Mechanism Design
- 26.1. Social-Choice Contexts, Mechanisms, Truth Telling, and the Revelation Principle
- 26.2. The Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem
- 26.3. Nash Implementation: Monotonicity and Maskin’s Theorem
- 26.4. The Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) Mechanisms
- 26.5. The VCG Mechanism and Auctions
- 26.6. Optimal Auctions: Myerson (1981)
- 26.7. Mechanism Design for Bilateral Bargaining: Myerson and Sattherthwaite (1983)
- 26.8. And What about … ? A Bottom Line on Mechanism Design
- Bibliographic Notes
- Problems

Appendix Nine. Strategic-Form Games
- A9.1. Basic Definitions
- A9.2. Mixed Strategies: Simple and Otherwise
- A9.3. Dominance: What (Probably?) Won’t Happen
- A9.4. Rationalizability: A Seemingly Different Take on What Won’t Happen
- A9.5. Nash Equilibrium
- A9.6. Correlated Equilibria
- Bibliographic Notes

Appendix Ten. Extensive-Form Games
- A10.1. The Definition of a Finite Extensive-Form Game
- A10.2. Diagramming Finite Extensive-Form Games
- A10.3. Games with Perfect Recall
- A10.4. Strategies and the Corresponding Strategic-Form Game
- A10.5. Mixed Strategies, Behaviorally Mixed Strategies, and Kuhn’s Theorem
- A10.6. Dominance and Nash Equilibrium
- A10.7. Beyond Finite Extensive-Form Games
- A10.8. Existence of Nash Equilibria
- A10.9. Strategically Equivalent Extensive Forms
- Bibliographic Notes

Appendix Eleven. Subgame Perfection (and Credibility)
- A11.1. Subgame Perfection
- A11.2. Games of Complete and Perfect Information
- A11.3. A Different Credibility Issue
- Bibliographic Notes

Appendix Twelve. Beliefs and Sequential Rationality
- A12.1. Motivation for this Appendix
- A12.2. Beliefs and Sequential Rationality
- A12.3. On-Path Consistency and Nash Equilibrium
- A12.4. Consistency of Off-Path Beliefs
- A12.5. The Bottom Line on Consistency of Beliefs (and Sequential Rationality)
- A12.6. Trembling-Hand-Perfect and Proper Equilibria
- Bibliographic Notes

Appendix Thirteen. Common Knowledge and Games of Incomplete Information
- A13.1. Common Knowledge Formalized
- A13.2. Games of Incomplete Information
- A13.3. (Non)Robustness to Lack of Common Knowledge
- Bibliographic Notes

Appendix Fourteen. Forward Induction, Strategic Stability and Beliefs-Based Refinements
- A14.1. Motivation
- A14.2. Equilibrium Outcomes Instead of Equilibria
- A14.3. Strategic Stability: An Overview
- A14.4. Disposing of Unstable Equilibrium Outcomes: The Never-a-Weak-Best-Response Test
- A14.5. The Intuitive Criterion and Beyond: Intuitively Appealing Stories (Perhaps)
- Bibliographic Notes

Appendix Fifteen. Repeated Play: Relationships, Reputation, and the Folk Theorem
- A15.1. The Base Model and Some Variations
- A15.2. The Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma
- A15.3. The (Straightforward) Folk Theorem(s)
- A15.4. Discount Factors Bounded Away From 1
- A15.5. (So-Called) Finite Horizons
- A15.6. Imperfect Observability, Hidden Information, and Public Equilibria
- A15.7. Instrumental Reputation
- A15.8. Enduring Private (Incomplete) Information
- A15.9. Building a Reputation?
- Bibliographic Notes

Appendix Sixteen. The Revelation Principle
- A16.1. The Problem
- A16.2. Direct Revelation and Truth Telling
- A16.3. The Revelation Principles
- A16.4. Can You Find a Referee? Practical Implementation of a Contingent Outcome
- A16.5. Variations
- Bibliographic Notes