Resale Price Maintenance and the Law : The Future of Vertical Restraints (Paperback)

Contents

List of Annexes and Tables

1. Topic Introduction

1. Background on Assessment and Application: Legal Issues and Development
2. Background on Enforcement Best Practices: Investigative Techniques and Enforcement Protocol

2. Research Objectives and Main Research Questions
3. Structure and Scope of Book
4. Conclusory Remarks

1. United States: Historical Origins & Legal Structure of RPM

1. The Introduction of the Sherman Act and its Common Law Roots: 1889-1910
2. Dr. Miles Era- the Right of Alienation and its Per Se Impact: 1911-1930
3. Fair Trade Era- Carving out Exceptions to the Sherman Act: 1930-1975
4. Post Fair Trade Era- Non-Price vs. Price Transition Towards Rule of Reason: 1975 ? 2007
5. Leegin Era- Maximum vs. Minimum RPM Transition Towards Rule of Reason: 2007 ? Present

2. Chapter Conclusion: US Historical Origins and Legal Structure

1. Chapter Introduction

1. General Economic Background of Vertical Restraints
2. General Economic Background of RPM

2. Background on Economic Theories of RPM

1. Link Between Schools of Thought and Economic Models
2. General Structure of Models: Vertical and Horizontal Elements of RPM
3. Digital Single Market, the E-Commerce Sector Inquiry and the Internet

1. Goals of the EC: Digital Single Market and E-Commerce Sector Inquiry
2. Models of Change: How the Internet Changed Market Dynamics

3. Conclusion: RPM Economic Background and E- Commerce

1. Anti-Competitive vs. Pro-competitive Economic Models of RPM

1. Anti-Competitive RPM Theories

1. Facilitating Collusion Upstream or Downstream
2. Increase in Prices, Lifecycles and Product Favouritism
3. Foreclosure and Restriction of Entry Both Upstream and Downstream
4. Foreclosure as a Commitment Device in Protection of Monopoly Rents
5. Dampen or Soften Competition Both Upstream and Downstream

2. Pro-Competitive RPM Theories

1. Special Services and Free-riding
2. Quality Certification and Signalling
3. Image Theory: The Allure of Paying More
4. Demand Uncertainty and Inventories
5. Outlets and Distribution Density
6. Moral Hazard and Double Moral Hazard
7. Production of a Good when Manufacturers’ Risks are Low
8. Contract Enforcement Mechanism and Quality Control
9. Loss Leader Selling
10. Less Efficient Dealer and/or Distributional Efficiency
11. Price Discrimination
12. Spatial Price Discrimination
13. Where imposing an RPM floor leads to a decrease in collusive behaviour
14. RPM with Optimal Delegation
15. New Market Entry or Product Launch
16. Pro-competitive models which rely on the purely vertical aspect of RPM

2. Conclusion: No Consensus among Economists on Impact of RPM

1. European Union: Historical Origins & Legal Structure of RPM

1. Historical Background of EU Vertical Enforcement
2. Current Legal Structure of EU Vertical Enforcement

1. Block Exemptions and their role in vertical restraint enforcement
2. Article 101(3): a closer examination of the individual assessment and its role in vertical restraint enforcement

2. Chapter Conclusion: EU Historical Origins and Legal Structure

1. Introduction to the Distinction between By-Object and By-Effect

1. A Background on By-Object Restrictions: The Finer Details
2. Categorisation and Analysis of By-Object Restrictions: A Deeper Dive

1. By-Object Categorisation: Overview of Differences between the EC and Case Law Approaches
2. By-Object Categorisation: Approaches to Appreciability

2. By-Effect Comparison: A Concise Overview of the Main Differences
3. Return to the RPM Legal Structure in light of the By-Object/By-Effect Dichotomy: Overview of the Current Approach to RPM Enforcement

1. Article 101(3): a closer examination of the individual assessment and its role in RPM enforcement

4. Chapter Conclusion

Abstract

1. Chapter Introduction
2. Time for a Change? Transatlantic Synchrony towards Revealing a Malfunctioning Regime

1. RPM Legal Regime: Current Challenges undermining its Efficacy

3. Horizontal Non-consensus: Should NCAs have their own agenda?
4. A New Way Forward: Developing a More Viable Approach to RPM Enforcement

1. Proposed RPM Solutions

1. Solution 1: Escaping automatic Article 101(3) TFEU applicability: developing a mechanism where RPM can be found inappreciable, and therefore, not in violation of Article 101(1) TFEU
2. Solution 2: Eliminate RPM’s hardcore designation by shifting its inclusion in the VBER from Article 4 to Article 5
3. Solution 3: Elimination of RPM’s hardcore designation through its application to Article 2 of the VBER (original and modified case scenarios)
4. Solution 4: Application of the De Minimus Doctrine to RPM
5. Solution 5: Recommendations for Improvement of Status Quo

5. Chapter Conclusion

1. Conclusion: Most Serious Considerations to Enhance the Efficacy of the Current RPM Regime

1. Overview of Solutions: The Best Way Forward

2. Final Remarks

Annex 3. RPM Model Timeline

Index