Worlds of Truth : A Philosophy of Knowledge (Hardcover)

Preface viii

Acknowledgments x

Introduction 1

Part I: Inquiry 5

Chapter 1: Justification 7

1. Beliefs 7

2. Access to truth 8

3. Cogito ergo sum 9

4. Mathematical certainty 11

5. Classical logic 12

6. C. I. Lewis’ empiricism 14

7. Access as a metaphor 17

8. J. F. Fries and K. Popper 18

9. Voluntarism and linearity 19

10. One-way justification 20

11. Beginning in the middle 21

12. Justification, contextual and comparative 22

13. Justification in the empirical sciences 23

14. Circularity versus linearity 25

15. Democratic controls 25

16. Interactionism 27

Chapter 2: Truth 30

1. Allergy to absolute truth 31

2. Provisionality and truth 32

3. Truth versus verification 34

4. Truth and fixity 36

5. Transparency, Tarski, and Carnap 38

6. Truth and certainty 42

7. Sentences as truth candidates 44

8. Theoretical terms 44

9. Varieties of instrumentalism 45

10. Pragmatism and instrumentalism 45

11. Systems, simplicity, reduction 46

12. Crises in science 51

13. Reduction and expansion 52

Chapter 3: Worlds 55

1. Philosophies of truth 55

2. Operationism and truth 57

3. Version-dependence 59

4. Differences among scientifically oriented philosophers 61

5. Monism, pluralism, plurealism 62

6. Realism versus irrealism 66

7. A theory of everything 72

8. The status of ethics 75

9. Emotive theories; Ayer and Stevenson 75

10. Moore’s ethical intuitionism 77

11. Dewey and ethical naturalism 79

12. Symbol, reference, and ritual 81

Part II: Related Pragmatic Themes 93

Chapter 4: Belief and Method 95

Introduction 95

1. Problems of pragmatism and pragmatic responses 98

2. Peirce’s theory of belief, doubt, and inquiry 102

3. Peirce’s comparison of methods 104

4. Difficulties in Peirce’s treatment 106

5. An epistemological interpretation 108

6. The primacy of method 109

Chapter 5: Action and Commitment 114

Chapter 6: Emotion and Cognition 125

1. Emotions in the service of cognition 126

2. Cognitive emotions 132

Index 143