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Nuclear Security: The Nexus Among Science, Technology and Policy

Nuclear Security: The Nexus Among Science, Technology and Policy (Hardcover, 2021)

Michael Nacht, Michael Frank, Stanley Prussin (지은이)
Springer
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Nuclear Security: The Nexus Among Science, Technology and Policy
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· 제목 : Nuclear Security: The Nexus Among Science, Technology and Policy (Hardcover, 2021) 
· 분류 : 외국도서 > 기술공학 > 기술공학 > 공학일반
· ISBN : 9783030750848
· 쪽수 : 340쪽
· 출판일 : 2021-11-20

목차

1.      Early days

1.1.   Development of atomic physics

1.2.   Origins of nuclear fission ? Great Britain and continental Europe

1.3.   Nuclear science I ? fission and criticality

1.3.1.      Fission, criticality and the fission chain

1.3.1.1.            Decay and half-life

1.3.2.      Energy scale of nuclear reactions relative to chemical reactions

1.3.3.      Nuclear reactions and cross sections

1.3.4.      Neutrons basics

1.3.4.1.            Neutrons from fission (nu-bar)

1.3.4.2.            Neutron energy and moderation concepts

1.3.5.      Critical mass, chain reactions, ene

rgy and fission products

1.3.6.      Enrichment and production

1.3.7.      Worked example ? Chicago Pile

1.4.   The Manhattan Project

1.4.1.      Organization

1.4.2.      Key personnel

1.4.3.      Technical obstacles

1.4.4.      The path to success

1.5.   Nuclear science II-  materials and enrichment

1.5.1.      Uranium enrichment

1.5.2.      Reactor basics and plutonium production

1.5.3.      Overview of proliferation-resistant fuel cycles and reactors

1.5.4.      Worked example ? centrifuge versus gaseous diffusion

1.6.   Truman’s decision to drop two atomic bombs

1.6.1.      Policy options, alter

native targets

1.6.2.      Threat assessment

1.6.3.      Strategic and tactical considerations

1.6.4.      Key players and the decision

1.6.5.      Alternative explanations

1.7.   Effects of the detonations

1.7.1.      Blast

1.7.2.      Radiation

1.7.3.      Shock waves

1.7.4.      Electromagnetic pulse

1.7.5.      Estimates of prompt and delayed fatalities

1.8.   Nuclear science III ? nuclear weapons and their effects

1.8.1.      Basic design concepts

1.8.2.      Weapon effects

1.8.3.      Blast and pressure

1.8.4.      Thermal Effects

1.8.5. &n

bsp;    Radiation effects

1.8.6.      Other (EMP, delayed fatalities, impact on climate change)

1.8.7.      Radiation effects on biological systems

1.8.8.      Weapons effects in military planning

1.8.9.      Comparison to conventional weapons and their uses

1.8.10.  Accuracy and effectiveness

1.8.11.  Hardening and survivability

1.8.12.  Worked example ? Hiroshima blast and radiation effects

 

2.      Postwar expansion (1946-1968)

2.1.   National security act, 1947

2.1.1.      National security council

2.1.2.      US Air Force

2.1.3.      Central Intelligence Agency

2.1.4.      Other consequences

2.2.   Atomic Energy

Commission

2.2.1.      Thermonuclear weapons debate

2.2.2.      Concern of Soviet weapons capability

2.3.   Nuclear science IV? fusion and thermonuclear weapons

2.3.1.      Basics of nuclear fusion

2.3.2.      Thermonuclear concepts

2.3.3.      Worked example ? to be determined

2.4.   Failed arms control and onset of the Cold War

2.4.1.      Acheson-Lillienthal report

2.4.2.      Failure of the Baruch plan

2.4.3.      Soviet resistance

2.4.4.      Korean War (1950-53)

2.4.4.1.            Role of nuclear weapons

2.4.4.2.            Beginnings of extended deterre

nce

2.5.   Nuclear proliferation begins

2.5.1.      Mirror Imaging: USSR program, Kurchatov, espionage from Manhattan project

2.5.2.      USSR weapons test (1949)

2.5.3.      The UK program and test (1952)

2.6.   Nuclear arms competition between the US and the USSR

2.6.1.      The Hydrogen Bomb

2.6.1.1.            Oppenheimer vs. Teller

2.6.1.2.            Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

2.6.2.      Early nuclear weapon strategy development

2.6.2.1.            Massive retaliation and its critics

2.6.2.2.            Deterrence and Secure 2nd Str

ike

2.6.2.3.            Strategic bombers, missiles, the Navy (SSBNS, SLBNS)

2.6.2.4.            Intercontinental delivery

2.6.3.      Soviet responses

 

 

2.7.   Nuclear Science V? modern weapons and the stockpile

2.7.1.      Constraints and weapon size and mass

2.7.2.      Constraints on weapon efficiency and yield

2.7.3.      Materials properties and equations of state

2.7.4.      Stockpile surveillance - assessing reliability

2.7.5.      Worked example ? yield and efficiency

3.      The problem of nuclear proliferation

3.1.   The International Atomic Energy Agency

3.1.1.   &

nbsp;  Application of nuclear energy for electric power generation

3.1.2.      Efforts to forestall proliferation

3.1.2.1.            Nuclear suppliers group

3.1.2.2.            Zangger committee

3.2.   Nuclear proliferation builds

3.2.1.      France ? 1960

3.2.2.      China ? 1964

3.2.3.      Israel ? 1965

3.2.4.      Sweden ? ended in  1968

3.3.   First arms control measures

3.3.1.      Distinction between disarmament and arms control

3.3.2.      Outer Space Treaty ? 1957

3.3.3.      Impact of Cuban Missile Crisis - 1962

3.3.4.      Limited Test Ban

Treaty - 1963

3.4.   Nuclear science VI? stockpile safety and security

3.4.1.      Use control concepts

3.4.2.      Stockpile aging and reliability

3.4.3.      One-point safety

3.4.4.      Worked example  - decay and aging of weapons material

 

4.      Technical, political and strategic evolution of deterrence and arms control

4.1.   Declaratory policies

4.2.   Deterrence policy

4.2.1.      Red and blue

4.2.2.      “No First Use” versus “Use to De-escalate”

4.3.   Extended deterrence and US nuclear deployments

4.4.   Flexible response

4.5.   Soviet and US buildup

4.6.   The importance of missile defense

4.7.   Nuclear arms contro

l and restraint

4.7.1.      Nuclear non-proliferation treaty ? 1968

4.7.2.      SALT I? 1972

4.7.2.1.            Importance of MIRVS

4.7.3.      ABM treaty -1972

4.7.4.      SALT II ? 1979

4.7.5.      Carter policy of deterring reprocessing of spent fuel - 1977

4.7.6.      Additional proliferation activities

4.7.6.1.            Indian test ? 1974

4.7.6.2.            Pakistani commitment

4.7.6.3.            German-Brazilian deal

4.7.6.4.            Taiwan, South Korea initiatives

4.7.7.  &

nbsp;   INF treaty ? 1987

4.7.8.      START ? 1991

4.8.   Nuclear science VII? monitoring, verification and proliferation

4.8.1.      Detonation monitoring and detection

4.8.2.      Safeguards technologies

4.8.3.      Other measurement concepts and activities

4.8.4.      Technologies for treaty verification and monitoring

4.8.5.      Proliferation resistant reactors and fuel cycle

4.8.6.      Worked example ? signature detection

 

5.      The second nuclear age  (1992- present)

5.1.   End of the Cold War

5.1.1.      START II (1993)

5.1.2.      Nunn-Lugar and cooperative threat reduction

5.2.   Ukraine and Kaz

hakstan nuclear disarmament

5.3.   Regional proliferation

5.3.1.      Iraq

5.3.2.      North Korea

5.3.3.      Libya

5.3.4.      India versus Pakistan

5.3.5.      Iran

5.4.   Counter-proliferation

5.4.1.      Proliferation security initiative

5.4.2.      Stuxnet

5.5.   Nuclear disarmament

5.5.1.      Disarmament and the legitimacy of the non-proliferation regime

5.5.2.      Historical examples of nuclear disarmament

5.5.2.1.            South Africa

5.5.2.2.            Brazil and Argentina

5.5.2.3.       

     Former Soviet Union

5.6.   Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

5.6.1.             Failed US. ratification

5.6.2.             Efforts at START III and completion of Strategic Offensive Arms Reduction Treaty (2002)     

5.6.3.      US withdrawal from the ABM treaty and its significance

5.6.4.             New START (2009)

5.7.   Nuclear science VIII? stockpile stewardship without nuclear testing

5.7.1.      Contrast with stockpile surveillance

5.7.2.      High energy density physics experiments

5.7.3.      Codes and supercomputers

5.7.4.      Worked example ? stockpi

le surveillance

5.7.5.      Worked example ? computational demands of physics codes

 

6.      Contemporary issues

6.1.   The Obama nuclear initiatives and their legacy

6.1.1.      Failed attempts to develop new nuclear weapons (RNEP and RRW)

6.1.2.      Beyond life extension programs

6.1.3.      The nuclear security initiatives

6.1.4.      Strengthening the NPT

6.2.   Russian adoption of “escalate to deescalate” doctrine

6.3.   Nuclear weapons and China’s “anti-access/area denial” strategy

6.4.   Cyber threats to nuclear command and control systems

6.5.   Nuclear weapons and cross domain deterrence

6.5.1.      Issues of proportionality and escalation control

6.6.   Impact of economic sanctions as a counter-proliferation tool

6.7.   The Iran Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)

6.7.1.      Elements of the agreement

6.7.2.      Strengths and weaknesses

6.7.3.      Effects on others

6.7.4.      Consequences

6.8.   Threat of nuclear terrorism

6.8.1.      Loss of control of a nuclear weapon

6.8.2.      Loss of control of nuclear material

6.8.3.      Loss of control of radioactive material and risks of radioactive dispersal devices

6.9.   Challenges of attribution, prosecution and retaliation

6.9.1.      Pre- and post-detonation attribution and forensics

6.9.2.      Decision-making complexities of cross discipline assessments6.

9.3.      Policy alternatives in response to nuclear weapon use

6.9.4.      Accuracy and timeliness requirements

6.10.                    Nuclear science IX ? Illicit material detection and forensic attribution

6.10.1.  Radiation detection and analysis

6.10.1.1.        Passive detection and spectroscopy

6.10.1.2.        Activation

6.10.1.3.        Radiography

6.10.2.  Nuclear forensics and attribution

6.10.2.1.        Decay products and chronometry

6.10.3.  Worked example ? standoff detection of special nuclear material

 

7.      Conclusion ? Will the “tradition of non-use” of nuclear weap

ons be sustained?  If not, what are the potential consequences?

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