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· 분류 : 외국도서 > 인문/사회 > 철학 > 정신/육체
· ISBN : 9783030953683
· 쪽수 : 313쪽
· 출판일 : 2022-04-12
목차
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER I - METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEM IN PHILOSOPHY AND NEUROSCIENCE
I.1. General IntroductionI.2. Metaphilosophy: Introduction and Analysis
I.3. The Philosophy of Neuroscience: Introduction and Analysis
I.3.1. Nature and Structure of Neuroscience
I.3.2. Neuroscience Concepts, Principles and MethodsI.3.3. Traditional Issues of Philosophy and Neuroscience
I.3.4. Philosophy of Neuroscience, Relationship with Other Areas of
Philosophy and new Areas of Research
I.4. Brief Introduction to Neuroscience
CHAPTER II - METHODOLOGICAL ISOLATIONISM
I.1. Isolationist Approach
I.1.1 Concepts Anticipate Facts
I.1.2. Wittgenstein's Influence
I.1.3. Example of an Isolationist Investigation: DeterminismI.1.4. Several defenses of the Isolationist Approach
II.2. Critical Reflection
II.2.1. The “Conceptual Invariance” Objection
II.2.2. Dennett's Objection
II.2.3. Searle's Objection
II.2.4. The Objection of “Philosophical Practice and Anti-Exceptionality”
III.3. Conclusion
CHAPTER III - REDUCTIVE NEUROPHILOSOPHY
I.1. Assumptions of the Reductive Approach
I.1.1. Denial of Dualism
I.1.2. The Concept of Reductionism
I.1.2.1. Reduction as Translation (RcT)
I.1.2.2. Reduction as Derivation (RcD)
I.1.2.3. Reduction as Explanation (RcE)
I.1.3. Reduction in Patricia Churchland
I.1.4. Folk Psychology Theory
I.1.5. Reduction in John Bickle
I.1.6. The Interteorethical Reduction Theory
I.2. Critical Reflection
II.2.1. The “Non-Theory” Objection
II.2.2. The “Multiple Realizability” Objection
II.2.3. The “Ontological Reduction” Objection
II.2.4. The “Methodological Isolation” Objection
II.2.5. The “Metaphilosophical” Objection
III.3. Conclusion
CHAPTER IV - NEUROPHENOMENOLOGY
I.1. Assumptions of the Neurophenomenology Approach
I.1.1. Phenomenology
I.1.2. The Importance of the Body and Criticism of the Brain
I.1.3. The 4E’s and Francisco Varela's Neurophenomenological Approach
I.1.4. An example of Neurophenomenological Research: the case of
Binocular Rivalry
I.1.5. An example of Neurophenomenological Research: the Self in Evan
Thompson
I.1.6. Three Pragmatic Lessons for a Rigorous Neurophenomenology
I.1.6.1. Science’s Reformulation
I.1.6.2. Better Science
I.1.6.3. The Focus on the Interviewer
II.2. Critical Reflection
II.2.1. The “Explanatory Gap” Objection
II.2.2. The “Introspection” Objection
II.2.3. The “Reductionist Accusation” ObjectionII.2.4. The Objection of “Inconclusive Metaphilosophy”
III.3. Conclusion
CHAPTER V - NON-REDUCTIVE NEUROPHILOSOPHYI.1. Assumptions of the Non-Reductive Approach
I.1.1. Methodological Balance
I.1.2. Methodological Strategies
I.1.2.1. The Asymmetry Principle
I.1.2.2. The Bidirectionality principle
I.1.2.3. The Principle of Transdisciplinary Circularity
I.1.3. The Nature and Metaphilosophy of the Neurophilosophical
Hypothesis
I.1.3.1. Brain Based (and not reduced) Perspective
I.1.3.2. First-Person Neuroscience
I.1.4.1. Example of Investigation of Non-Reductive Neurophilosophy: the
case of the Self
I.1.4.2. Example of Investigation of Non-Reductive Neurophilosophy: the
Self and COVID-19
I.1.4.3. Example of Investigation of Non-Reductive Neurophilosophy: the
case of Emotions
II.2. Critical Reflection
II.2.1. Objection of the “Category Mistake”
II.2.2. Objection of “Methodological Irrelevance”
II.2.3. Objection of “Inaccurate Metaphilosophy”
III.3. Conclusion
CHAPTER VI - QUALIA AND INFORMATION IN PHILOSOPHY AND NEUROSCIENCE
I.1. Concept of “Qualia”
I.1.1. The Isolationist Approach and Qualia
I.1.2. The Reductive Approach and Qualia
I.1.3. The Neurophenomenology Approach and Qualia
I.1.4. The Non-Reductive Neurophilosophy Approach and Qualia
II.2. Concept of “Information” and the Different Approaches
III.3. Conclusion
CONCLUSION
