This is Technology Ethics : An Introduction (Paperback)

Dedication

Preface

Chapter 1: What Is Technology (from an Ethical Point of View)?

                1: A Hut in the Black Forest

2: The Question Concerning Technology: The Instrumental Theory of Technology from Martin Heidegger to Joanna Bryson

3: “Post-phenomenology” and the Mediation Theory of Technology

4: Technologies Conceived of as Being More Than Mere Means or Instruments?

5: Technologies Regarded as Moral Agents

6: Technologies Regarded as Moral Patients

7: Some of the Key Types of Technologies That Will Be Discussed at Greater Length in Later Chapters of the Book

Chapter 2: What Is Ethics? (And, in Particular, What Is Technology Ethics?)

                1: Two Campaigns

                2: The Ethics of Virtue and Human Flourishing in Ancient Greece

                3: Ancient Chinese Confucianism and Traditional Southern African Ubuntu Ethics

                4: Kantian Ethics

                5: Utilitarianism and Consequentialist Ethical Theories

6: If Ethics More Generally Can Be All the Things Discussed in the Previous Sections, Then What Does This Mean for Technology Ethics in Particular?

7: How Technology Ethics Can Challenge and Create a Need for Extensions of More General Ethical Theory

Chapter 3: Methods of Technology Ethics: The Ethics of Self-Driving Cars as a Case Study

                1: Methodologies of Ethics?

                2: The Ethics of Self-Driving Cars

                3: Ethics by Committee

                4: Ethics by Analogy: The Trolley Problem Comparison

                5: Empirical Ethics

                6: Applying Traditional Ethical Theories

                7: Which Method(s) Should We Use in Technology Ethics? Only One or Many?

Chapter 4: Artificial Intelligence, Value Alignment, and the Control Problem

                1: Averting a Nuclear Attack?

                2: What Is Artificial Intelligence and What Is the Value Alignment Problem?

3: The Good and the Bad, and Instrumental and Non-instrumental Values and Principles

4: Instrumentally Positive Value-Alignment of Technologies

5: Instrumentally Negative Mis-alignment of Technologies

6: Positive Non-instrumental Value Alignment of Technologies

7: Negative Non-instrumental Value Mis-alignment of Technologies

8: The Control Problem

9: Control as a Value: Instrumental or Non-instrumental? And Are There Some Technologies It Might Be Wrong to Try to Control?

Chapter 5: Behavior Change Technologies, Personal Autonomy, and the Value of Control

                1: A Better You?

                2: Behavior Change Technologies

                3: Control: Three Basic Observations

                4: Key Dimensions of Control

                5: Behavior Change Technologies and the “Subjects” and “Objects” of Control

                6: The Value and Ethical Importance of Control

                7: Concluding This Chapter

Chapter 6: Responsibility and Technology: Mind the Gap(s)?

                1: Two Events

2: What Is Responsibility? Different Ways in Which People Can Be Held Responsible and Different Things for Which People Can Be Held Responsible

3: Responsibility Gaps: General Background

4: Responsibility Gaps Created by Technologies

5: Filling Responsibility Gaps by Having People Voluntarily Take Responsibility

6: Should We Perhaps Welcome Responsibility Gaps?

7: Responsible Machines?

8: Human-Machine Teams and Responsibility

9: Concluding This Chapter

Chapter 7: Can a Machine Be a Moral Agent? Should Machines Be Moral Agents?

                1: Machine Ethics

                2: Arguments in Favor of Machine Ethics and Types of Artificial Moral Agents

                3: Objections to the Machine Ethics Project

                                3.1: First Objection: Morality Cannot Be Fully Codified

3.2: Second Objection: It Is Unethical to Create Machines That We Allow to Make Life-and-Death Decisions About Human Beings

3.3: Third Objection: Moral Agents Need to Have Moral Emotions and Machines Do Not/Cannot Have Emotions

3.4: Fourth Objection: Machines Are Not Able to Act for Reasons

3.5: Brief Reminder of the Objections to Machine Ethics Considered Above

                4: Possible Ways of Responding to the Critiques of the Machine Ethics Project

4:1: First Response: Bottom-Up Learning Rather Than Top-Down Rules-Following

4:2: Second Response: Resisting the Idea That Machines/Technologies Should Ever Be Full Moral Agents

4:3: Third Response: Switching to Thinking in Terms of Human-Machine Teams Rather Than in Terms of Independent Artificial Moral Agents

                5: Concluding This Chapter

Chapter 8: Can Robots Be Moral Patients, with Moral Status?

                1: The Tesla Bot and Erica the Robot

                2: What Is a Humanoid Robot? And Why Would Anybody Want to Create a            Humanoid Robot?

                3: Can People Act Rightly or Wrongly Towards Robots?

                4: Can Robots Have Morally Relevant Properties/Abilities?

                5: Can Robots Imitate or Simulate Morally Relevant Properties or Abilities?

6: Can Robots Represent or Symbolize Morally Relevant Properties or Abilities?

7: Should We be Discussing – or Perhaps Better Be Avoiding – the Question of Whether Robots Can Be Moral Patients, with Moral Status?

Chapter 9: Technological Friends, Lovers, and Colleagues

                1: Replikas, Chuck and Harmony, and Boomer

2: Two Examples of Ethical Issues That Arise in This Context Independently of Whether Technologies Can Be Our Friends, Lovers, or Colleagues

                3: Technological Friends

                4: Technological Lovers and Romantic Partners

                5: Robotic Colleagues

                6: Are these All-or-Nothing Matters? Respect for Different Points of View

                7: The Technological Future of Relationships

Chapter 10: Merging with the Machine: The Future of Human-Technology Relations

                1: The Experience Machine

                2: Different Ways of Merging with – or Merging with the Help of – Technology

3: Transhumanism, Posthumanism, and Whether We Should Become – or Perhaps Already Are – Cyborgs

4: Some Critical Reflections on the Proposals to Merge with Technologies and the Arguments and Outlooks Used in Favor of Such Proposals

5: Concluding Reflections: Revisiting the Hut in the Black Forest

Acknowledgments