History of Transportation in Korea

Preface ... In any era, the past remains certain,
the present is filled with hesitation, and
the future is always uncertain.

Chapter 1 Expressways

1. The Era of Highways Begins in Korea ..... 27
† War-torn Road Bridges Have Begun to be Restored
† The Global Flow of Highways and our Challenges

2. The Emergence of Gyeongin and Gyeongbu Expressways..... 34
† Korea’s First Gyeongin Expressway
† Gyeongbu Expressway: The Dawn of the Expressway Era
† Interesting Stories about the Gyeongbu Expressway

3. Highways in Bloom..... 52
† The Honam·Namhae Expressway, which Provided a Direct Connection to the Three Major Economic Zones of Gyeonin, Yeongnam, and Honam
† The Yeongdong·Donghae Expressway, which Connected the Metropolitan Area and Gangwon Area
† The Toll-Imposing Policy for the Free Expressways
† Vivid Stories Surrounding Early Highways

4. Independent Highway Policies..... 69
† The Gwangju-Daegu Expressway Brought about a Great Failure
† The Jungbu Expressway: Enhanced Design Standards
† Untold Stories of the Jungbu Expressway

5. Mature of Highway Policies..... 105
† Gyeonggi Region Multimodal Transportation Study
† Understanding Future Traffic Patterns
† Planning the Seoul Outer Ring Expressway
† Banwol Line (Sadang-Banwol Subway Line) Plan
† Establishment of Mid-Term Investment Plans
† Retrospect and Reflection
6. The Beginning of Highway Traffic Management Policy..... 137
† Efforts to Make Traffic Congestion Costs a National Issue
† Establishment of the Presidential SOC Investment Planning Unit
† The Birth of Expressway Traffic Management Policy
† Introduction of Expressway Bus-only Lane System

7. Reflections on Highway Policies..... 186
† Concerns Regarding Transportation Policies
† Future Research Directions

Chapter 2 Korean High-Speed Rail

1. Overview of the Gyeongbu High-Speed Rail Project..... 213
† Brief History of the Gyeongbu High-Speed Rail Project
† Chronology of Key Developments
† The Gyeongbu High-Speed Rail and the Stance of Successive Administrations

2. The Birth of the Gyeongbu High-Speed Rail Policy..... 229
† Early Research Efforts on High-Speed Rail
† Feasibility Study on the Gyeongbu High-Speed Rail by the Korea Research
Institute for Human Settlements (KRIHS)
† Development of the Situation after the Initial Research

3. The Emergence of Minister Kim Chang-geun and the Gyeongbu High-Speed
Rail..... 245
† Minister Kim Chang-geun
† The Launch and Progress of the Gyeongbu High-Speed Rail Engineering Study Project
† Key Aspects of the Gyeongbu High-Speed Rail Engineering Study
† Long-Term Railway Network Concept
† RFP and Rolling Stock Selection
† Request for Proposal (RFP)

4. Episodes from the Gyeongbu High-Speed Rail Project..... 281
† The Policy Discussion that Initiated the Gyeongbu High-Speed Rail Project
† Selection of the Engineering Study Foreign Consultant for the Gyeongbu
High-Speed Rail
† Anecdotes from an Official Overseas Trip

5. Conclusion of the Overseas Trip and Preparation for the Symposium ..... 297
† Wrapping Up the Trip and Preparing for the International Symposium
† International High-Speed Rail Symposium
† Reflection on the Minister's Vision

6. Opposition Sentiments and Efforts to Persuade Regarding the Gyeongbu
High-Speed Rail Project..... 312
† The Ministry of Transportation’s Efforts to Persuade the Press Corps
† Promotion of the Feasibility of the Gyeongbu High-Speed Rail Project

7. Reflection and Retrospection on the Gyeongbu High-Speed Rail Project.... 321
† Key Leaders of the Gyeongbu High-Speed Rail Project
† Reflections and Lessons Learned from Key Opposition Arguments
† Concerns About Osong Station and Sejong City’s Location

8. High-Speed Rail and Integrated Transit Complex..... 340
† The Emergence of the Integrated Transit Complex Policy
† Directions for Enhancing Korea’s Integrated Transit Complex System
† Concerns Regarding the Samsung Station Integrated Transit Complex

Chapter 3 Urban Transportion Policies in Seoul Metropolitan Government

1. Bus Transportation Policy in Seoul under the IMF System..... 362
† Restructuring of Bus Industry
† Integration of Bus and Subway Cards
† Measures to Increase Bus Card Usage in Preparation for the Electronic Card
Era
† Introduction of the Transfer Discount System
† An Anecdote on the Introduction of the Transfer Fare Discount System
† Seoul City’s On-site Emergency Policy, Different from the Central Government

2. Seoul City’s ITS (Intelligent Transportation System) Policy..... 386
† Inner Ring Expressway Traffic Management System
† Medium-Term Plan for the Installation of Urban Expressway Traffic
Management System
† Namsan Area Traffic Information Management System
† Pedestrian Signals
† Bus Information System (BIS)

3. Seoul's Parking Policy..... 399
† Marking of Parking Spaces on Secondary Roads
† Modernization and Privatization of Parking Lot Management
† Strengthened Enforcement Against Illegal Parking
† Expansion of Parking Supply

4. Seoul's Traffic Information System..... 414
† Improvement of Road Signs
† Episodes Related to the Preparation of the Subway Guide Map
† Subway Transfer Guidance Strip Marking

5. Reflection and Expectations for Seoul’s Transportation Policies..... 423

There is not much information avilable on the history of roads in Korea. It can only be inferred from Kim Jeong-ho's Daedongyeojido. The proper information on the road is found from the Shin-jak-ro (a new road) that appeared during the Japanese occupation. Hirobumi Ito began to create roads around the grain area to transport supplies. In 1907, roads between Jinnampo-Pyongyang, Mokpo-Gwangju,
Gunsan-Jeonju, and Daegu-Gyeongju were constructed, and these roads later became major sections of the Korea’s national highway network.

In terms of military, political, and economic terms, the road system was divided into 1st, 2nd, 3rd grade, and off-grade, and the road management entity was designated as the main agent in charge of construction and maintenance. In 1917, the second phase of the road maintenance plans was established, and the road network over 1,000 km was constructed by 1922. After that, the existing road regulations were abolished and the Joseon (Korea) Road Decree was promulgated. In addition, the existing road classifications were abolished and the road management was systematized by dividing national roads, local roads, city roads, and eup-myeon roads. (Excerpted from “1. The Era of Highways Begins in Korea”)

In the 1960s, as discussions on urban planning and land planning became active, experts were trained as they were insufficient, and mid- to long-term land planning was created with the help of international organizations and government agencies. However, none of the domestic and foreign experts, including the Korea-US Joint Investigation Committee, mentioned the necessity or possibility of
highways at this time.
Until then, compared to advanced countries, we had no experience of planning or constructing modern roads by ourselves. Accordingly, stimulated by the proliferation of automobiles and the establishment of highway networks in developed countries, the national development master plan of the past was revised and supplemented in 1967. At this time, the concept of a six-lane road appeared on the Gyeongin axis. It was later developed into the Gyeongin Expressway, which cost $68 million in ADB loan funds. In other words, industrial activities became active due to the successful implementation of the five year economic development plan, and the importance of ports and their connecting roads was emphasized as the support infrastructure.
The Gyeongin Expressway is the first expressway in Korea. Construction began in 1967, and 23.5 km between Seoul and Gajwa was completed in 1968. With an additional 6 km between Gajwa and Yonghyeon-dong opened in 1969, the entire section was completely opened. It is earlier than the construction period of the Gyeongbu Expressway from 1968 to 1970, and the total construction cost was 3.15 billion won at that time, which cost 105 million won per km (Excerpted from “ 2. The Emergence of Gyeongin and Gyeongbu Expressways”)

The Gyeongin and Gyeongbu Expressways were initially established as toll roads, reflecting the government's view that expressways should naturally be toll-based. This was due to the enormous construction costs, as well as the significant annual maintenance and operational expenses required. However, the Honam and Namhae Expressways, constructed around the same time as the Yeongdong and Donghae Expressways, were part of a World Bank loan project. As such, their operational methods and toll policies were determined in consultation with the lending institution, leading to their initial operation as free roads. Over time, as the expressway network expanded, the costs for construction, operation, and maintenance continued to grow. Consequently, the government and the Korea Highway Corporation decided to convert the then-free Honam and Namhae Expressways into toll roads to secure funding for expressway development.
The World Bank opposed this move, arguing that the traffic volume on these expressways was insufficient at the time and that Korea, being in the early stages of economic development, should encourage economic activity through free road access. They contended that imposing tolls could discourage road usage and incur additional costs, such as those for installing and operating toll booths. This stance aligned with the prevailing economic principle of the time, which advocated for the free provision of public services. In other words, roads were seen not as profit-generating enterprises but as social infrastructure that provided affordable and fast transportation to the general public, thereby reducing the cost of economic activities and fostering greater profits. The resulting increase in business revenue would, in turn, be compensated through higher tax revenues. (Excerpted from “ 3. Highways in Bloom”)

When the Gyeongbu Expressway first opened in 1970, the total number of registered vehicles nationwide was only 130,000. More than 60% of the total traffic volume consisted of freight trucks, giving the expressway a strong industrial road character. As a result, the government actively promoted it as a backbone supporting the national economy, and a barometer of industrial activity, emphasizing that our expressways were designed primarily for freight vehicles rather than passenger cars. At that time, it would still take a considerable amount of time before personal income levels would allow individuals to own private cars.
The average daily traffic volume on the Seoul-Suwon section of the Gyeongbu Expressway surged from 5,000 vehicles in 1970 to 13,000 in 1975 and 30,000 in 1980, reflecting an annual growth rate of 15%. As Korea’s economic development policies, initiated in the early 1960s, continued to succeed, young people from rural areas flocked to cities in search of better opportunities. As a result, during major holidays such as Chuseok, highways suffered from heavy congestion due to the influx of people returning to their hometowns. During this period, it was common for people to spend entire nights in front of train stations just to purchase tickets in advance. Starting in the 1970s, express buses began sharing the burden of holiday travel with railways. Meanwhile, as economic growth led to rising personal incomes, private car ownership gradually increased.

However, in 1980, the country faced an economic downturn as the May 18 Gwangju Uprising and the Second Oil Shock coincided, causing Korea’s previously rapid economic growth rate to plummet to -5%. At the beginning of the 1980s, global oil prices more than doubled, exacerabating the economic difficulties. However, starting in 1981, a global economic boom resumed, and with Korea’s export driven policies in full force, the nation achieved remarkable growth rates of 7.2% in 1981, 13.4% in 1983, and 10.6% in 1984, continuing its unprecedented economic expansion. As a result, the demand for factory workers surged, leading to an explosion in urban populations. The increase in urban laborers contributed to a rise in national income, which in turn sparked a full-fledged private car boom. By 1985, Korea had entered an era of over one million registered vehicles for the first time in its history. (Excerpted from “4. Independent Highway Policies”)

The vehicle ownership growth was so extreme that previous road investments could not keep up with increasing traffic volumes. The government needed to accelerate expressway construction and expansion. At the same time, with the explosive growth in freight transportation, there was an urgent need for demand management policies. This included imposing road user costs up to the marginal economic cost, thereby reducing the use of expressways by passenger vehicles.
The backlog of cargo at Incheon Port had reached a critical level due to the escalating difficulties in inland transportation. And the Seoul-Suwon expressway section was experiencing similar severe traffic congestion. Accordingly, Busan Port’s freight transport was also severely disrupted, leading to the same serious congestion problems as Incheon Port. The situation became so dire that some export shipments were delayed or even canceled. As a result, trade businesses faced skyrocketing demurrage charges, soaring transportation costs, and rising ancillary expenses, leading to growing dissatisfaction among companies.
At this critical moment, the government needed urgent policies to improve the worsening traffic situation. While long-term transportation investments were necessary, the immediate congestion crisis required extraordinary measures. One solution was to reform expressway traffic management policies to maximize the efficiency of existing highway infrastructure. To push for public consensus on these measures, the Korea Transport Institute(KOTI) convinced the Ministry of Construction and the Korea Highway Corporation to hold a public debate on “the improved efficiency of expressway traffic management” in January 1990. (Excerpted from “6. The Beginning of Highway Traffic Management Policy”)

It is necessary to address the fallacy of the "Equal Service, Equal Toll" policy that was implemented several years ago. Upon taking office, the Moon Jae-in administration announced the "Private Expressway Toll Management Roadmap" in August 2018, pledging to significantly lower tolls on privately operated expressways to levels similar to those on publicly funded expressways managed by the Korea Highway Corporation (KHC). This policy was a direct response to complaints from some users of privately funded expressways who felt that their tolls were unreasonably high compared to those of public expressways. However, rather than conducting a thorough analysis, the administration rushed to appease public opinion, implementing a populist policy that ultimately undermined the credibility of national policy decisions.
In May 2022, the Joong Ang Ilbo reported on this issue as follows.
"In August 2018, the Moon Jae-in government announced the 'Private Expressway Toll Management Roadmap.' The plan aimed to reduce the tolls on privately funded expressways, which were on average 1.43 times higher than those on public expressways, bringing them down to approximately 1.1 times the public expressway tolls by 2022. To achieve this goal, the government employed three key strategies: (1) In the case of the Seoul-Chuncheon Expressway, the original 30-year operational period was extended by 20 years in exchange for lowering tolls; (2) a financial restructuring method was used; and (3) a new investment model was introduced, where new investors would prepay the expected profit margin and then operate the expressway for an additional 20 years to recover their investment. This approach was applied to expressways such as the Cheonan-Nonsan Expressway and the Daegu-Busan Expressway. Due to the uncertainty in recouping
investment costs, the new investor designated for this plan was the Korea Highway Corporation." (Exerpted from “7. Reflections on Highway Policies”)

When the engineering study for establishing a master plan of construction of the Gyeongbu High-Speed Rail began in 1989, Korea was far from having the technical capacity for high-speed rail. At the time, not only was our ability to manufacture even conventional trains limited, but there were only two specialized railway engineering firms in the entire country. Despite this poor situation, visionary leaders sought to conceive cutting-edge global technology. In the mid-1970s, some
even proposed a bold idea of adopting maglev trains - an idea that existed only in theory and office models at the time - to establish an innovative transportation system that would maximize the efficiency of Korea’s limited land area.
Today, in virtually every developed country high-speed rail has become an essential transportation infrastructure, with a vibrant construction boom in full swing. Although China started its high-speed rail development relatively late, it has become one of the most aggressive nations in the field. High-speed rail has now become a benchmark of a country's technological and financial strength. Korea, too, has made remarkable progress, developing its own high-speed rail brands such as Sancheon and Haemu and expanding into international markets. We are now in an era where every region across the country is calling for the construction of high-speed rail for their areas.

However, looking back, I cannot shake the unsettling thought of what might have happened if we had not succeed at that time. If the Kim Dae-jung administration had maintained its initial opposition to the Gyeongbu High-Speed Rail project - following the lukewarm stance of the previous Kim Young-sam government - and had not eventually taken a more favorable position, or if Minister Lee Jung-moo had not demonstrated firm determination in pushing the project forward, there is no doubt that the project would have been halted. Readers might find this hard to believe, but a glimpse of the political climate at the time can be seen in a questioning-to-the government session in March 1993, early in the Kim Dae-jung administration.
During a National Assembly’s Budget and Accounts Committee hearing, Representative Chung Woo-taek suggested halting the project and seeking an alternative, while he questioned whether the government should reconsider proceeding with the project. Had we failed to overcome such opposition, Korea might still be without high-speed rail today. (Excerpted from “Chapter 2 Korean High-speed Rail”)

At the time, the leading countries in high-speed rail operation and development were Japan, France, and Germany, with the UK, Italy, Sweden, and Canada also actively conducting research. To gather comprehensive technical information on high-speed rail systems, the study team utilized Louis Berger’s international information network and conducted on-site visits to major foreign rail authorities, including: SNCF (French National Railway Company), Deutsche Bundesbahn (West German Federal Railway) and the Ministry of Science and Technology of Germany, Japan’s Ministry of Transport and JNR (Japan National Railways, predecessor of today’s JR Group), and US Federal Railroad Administration. These interactions provided valuable insights into high-speed rail technologies and policy directions, shaping the foundation for Korea’s future high-speed rail development.

During the 1983 visit to Germany, the research team, with the cooperation of the German Ministry of Science and Technology, went to see the Transrapid, the world’s first maglev train, which had generated global excitement as a futuristic mode of transportation. The team visited the Emsland Test Facility, where the Transrapid was undergoing test operations after the completion of its technological
development. However, German railway authorities showed little interest in maglev technology at the time. They believed that it was technically immature and incompatible with existing railway infrastructure, making immediate commercialization unfeasible.

Following the visit to Germany, our team traveled to the United States and visited the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). We asked, "Many advanced countries are actively developing high-speed rail, and even in the U.S., the private sector is discussing a high-speed rail line between LA and Las Vegas. Why is the federal government not taking any visible action?" The FRA official responded, "We have no plans for high-speed rail. The U.S. spans over 3,000 miles from coast to coast, and 300 km/h technology is not a viable solution for such distances. Instead, we envision a 21st-century project - maglev trains traveling at supersonic speeds in a vacuum tube." (Excerpted from “2. The Birth of the Gyeongbu High-Speed Rail Policy”)

From the moment Minister Kim Chang-geun took office, he worked tirelessly to build a consensus within the government and persuade related ministries. In July 1989, the Gyeongbu High-Speed Rail Engineering Study Project was officially launched, with the author appointed as the project leader. The purpose of this project was to identify the most suitable technology for Korea's environment, design a safe and efficient rail route, and establish a master plan and engineering design that would enable the selection of the best rolling stock. Given the unprecedented scale of investment and the complexity of high-speed rail technology - far surpassing that of any previous infrastructure project - a steering committee was established within the government, comprising representatives from all relevant ministries. This committee was responsible for reviewing and approving policies related to the project. Minister Kim personally instructed the author, saying, "Dr. Cha, drop everything else you’re working on. From now on, you will follow my directives and dedicate yourself entirely to the high-speed rail project." In June 1989, the minister and the author together with the two director generals of the KNR traveled to Japan, France, and Germany to negotiate technological cooperation agreements. Later, in October of the same year, an International Symposium on High-Speed Rail was held in Seoul, where over 100 experts from 11 countries, including those three key nations, were invited to exchange technical knowledge and discuss policy frameworks over a week-long event.(Excerpted from “3. The Emergence of Minister Kim Chang-geun and the Gyeongbu High-Speed Rail“)

That morning, when I arrived at the breakfast meeting, I found several high-ranking officials in attendance, including Minister Kim Chang-geun, Moon Hee-gap (Senior Presidential Secretary for Economic Affairs), Lee Han-dong (Minister of Home Affairs), Lee Seung-yoon (Minister of Finance), Park Seung (Minister of Construction), and Cho Soon (Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs).
Once everyone had arrived, Minister Kim Chang-geun asked me to begin by explaining Korea’s future railway development outlook. I briefly summarized the materials I had prepared. Deputy Director Shin Young-guk then followed with a presentation on the direction for high-speed rail implementation. At this point, breakfast was served, momentarily disrupting the atmosphere. As the meal began, Minister Kim Chang-geun initiated the discussion:
"As we have just heard, our future economy cannot function without high-speed rail. The entire world is moving in this direction, and we must also pursue this project - not only to solve transportation issues but also to secure the advanced technologies that our country will need in the 21st century. I ask for your support, Ministers."
Following his remarks, the attendees shared their opinions in turn. Below is a summary of the discussions, based on my recollection.(Excerpted from “4. Episodes from the Gyeongbu High-Speed Rail Project“)

On a bitterly cold winter night in 1998, I was waiting for a bus at the bus stop, but no matter how long I waited, the bus didn’t come. I was extremely frustrated, and a thought suddenly crossed my mind: "At first, people will blame the bus company, but in the end, won't they blame the supervisory authority, the Seoul city governmen - that is, me?"
So, the next morning, as soon as I arrived at work, I asked the department manager why this was happening. I was told that there were designated buses, but the buses were arbitrarily changing their routes to areas with more passengers. Since buses were licensed businesses, they had an obligation to operate as promised to citizens, according to the designated routes and schedules. I then asked, “Why is such illegal operation happening, and why is no action being taken?” and received an answer that was almost impossible to believe: “The bus company has already gone bankrupt, and the owner has disappeared. So, the labor union has taken over the company and is operating illegally, sharing the cash income among themselves. We are taking steps to impose penalties as per the law.”
And the explanation was that these cases of illegal route operations had been continuing since last year. In the previous year, 1997, the penalties had reached around 3.7 billion won across 12,600 cases. They were not afraid of fines or penalties at all. They believed that since they no longer had an owner, there was no need to pay fines. Citizens didn’t know these details and were just blaming the
authorities. When I asked, “Why don’t you cancel the licenses of these companies?” the response I received was, “There is no regulation that allows us to cancel the licenses.” This answer left me dumbfounded. (Excerpted from “1. Bus Transportation Policy in Seoul under the IMF System“)

Nowadays, when pedestrians cross the street in Seoul, pedestrian signals at nearly every intersection ensure that crossing safely has become a part of daily life. However, when pedestrian signals were first introduced, there was considerable controversy. In November 2001, as the World Cup stadium in Sangam-dong was completed, the surrounding roads and sidewalks were renovated, and pedestrian signals were first trial-installed on the crosswalks near the stadium entrances. At the time, private contractors proposed two methods for pedestrian signals to the city of Seoul. One was a bar graph that gradually reduced to indicate the remaining time, and the other was displaying the remaining time in numerical form. The problem was that decisions regarding these traffic safety devices had to go through a review committee under the traffic police authorities, and it often took too long to make a decision after a comprehensive review of practicality, safety, and acceptability. Aware of this issue, the contractors, unable to wait for the police decision, directly brought the issue to the city of Seoul. As a result, experts, including Kim Dae-ho, the traffic operation manager of the traffic management office, collaborated and ensured that pedestrian signals were included in the traffic improvement project for the World Cup, allowing for a trial installation in the intersections around the World Cup stadium in Sangam-dong before the police review process was completed. This led to the recognition of the effectiveness of pedestrian signals during the World Cup, and following this, they
were expanded throughout the city, leading to the current pedestrian signal system. (Excerpted from “ 2. Seoul City’s ITS (Intelligent Transportation System)
Policy“)