The Politics of Separation of the Korean Peninsula, 1943-1953

Preface to the English Edition
Preface
Acknowledgement
Abbreviation
Remarks for Romanization of Korean Characters and Bibliography

Chapter 1. Introduction
―Points of View and Methodology of Contemporary Korean History
1. Introduction: What is the Significance of the Term ‘Contemporary History’?
2. Trends and Dynamics in the Study of Korean Separation
1) The Scientific Quest of the Young Historians
2) The Lessons of Korean-American Relations
3) The U.S. National Archives Documents Released
4) The Democratization Movement in South Korea
5) The Collapse of the USSR and the East European Socialist Countries
6) The Development of the Copy Machine
3. Points of View on the Separation: Causes or Responsibilities?
1) Were the Major Powers Responsible?
2) Wasn’t Korea Responsible?
3) Liberation from the 'History of Attribution'
4. Conclusion: Return to Historicism

Part I. The Age of Sterility

Chapter 2. The Decision Process of the Separation of the Korean Peninsula
―Focusing on the U.S. Role and Its Change
1. Introduction
2. Korean Problems on the Conference Table during World War II
1) The Washington Conference (March 27, 1943)
2) The Cairo Conference (November 22-26, 1943)
3) The Teheran Conference (November 27-December 2, 1943)
4) The Yalta Conference (January 30-February 11, 1945)
5) The Stalin-Hopkins Meeting in Moscow (May 26-June 6, 1945)
6) The Potsdam Conference (July 6-August 1, 1945)
7) The Council of Foreign Ministers in London (September 12-October 2, 1945)
3. Factors Influencing the U.S. Foreign Policy toward Separation of the Korean Peninsula
1) The U.S. Lack of Information and Imperialist Arrogance
2) The U.S. Overestimated Russia’s Capacity to End the War
3) The U.S. Satiation from the Occupation of Japanese Islands
4) The Decline of China in the International Circle
5) Discordance among the U.S. Decision-Makers on Separation of the Korean Peninsula
4. Several Devices to Divide the Korean Peninsula
1) The OPD, Department of War
2) The Joint War Plans Committee (JWPC)
3) The SWNCC
4) The Proposed Military Occupation by JWPC
5) The CINCPAC
6) The OPD, Revised
5. Process of Demarcation on the 38th Parallel
6. Conclusion

Chapter 3. The Decision Process of the Trusteeship
―Focusing on the Change of U.S. Ideas
1. Introduction
2. Factors in the U.S. Policy in Deciding the Trusteeship
1) FDR's Ideals as a Neo-Wilsonian
2) Experiences in the Philippines
3) Anti-Colonial Trends in the U.S.
4) Ensuring One Power Does Not Gain Dominance
3. Standpoints of the USSR, the United Kingdom, and China
1) Response of the USSR
2) Standpoint of United Kingdom
3) Standpoint of China
4. Change in the Trusteeship Policy
1) Change of Presidency in the U.S. and Beginning of the Cold War
2) Success of the Atomic Bomb
3) Anti-Trusteeship Movement in South Korea
4) Change of USSR Policy
5. Conclusion

Chapter 4. The Policy of the U.S. Army Military Government in Korea
―The First Year
1. Introduction
2. Direction of Military Government
3. Enforcement of Occupation
4. Early Stage of Military Government
5. Conclusion

Chapter 5. The Structure of the U.S. Army Military Government in Korea
1. Introduction
2. The United States Army Military Government (USAMGIK)
3. The Police
4. The Military
5. Auxiliary Organization: Northwest Young Association (NWYA)
6. Conclusion

Chapter 6. Disposition of Vestiges of the Japanese Colonial Rule
1. Introduction
2. Repatriation of the Japanese People
3. Activities of New Korean Company (NKC)
1) Management of the Enemy Properties
2) Gathering of Tenants
4. Activities of the Central Land Administration
5. Confusion of the Attempted Land Reform
6. Conclusion

Chapter 7. Conflicts between the U.S. Army Military Government and the Korean People
1. Introduction
2. Conflicts with Eminent Persons of the Provisional Government
3. Response to the Leftists
1) Composition and Characteristics of the Leftist Groups
2) USAMGIK’s Perception of the Leftists
3) The Counterfeit Money Incident of the Chosun Printing Company and the Suppression of Leftists
4. Conclusion

Chapter 8. Interim Legislative Assemblies under the Military Government
1. Introduction: USAMGIK’s Perception of the Legislative Assembly
2. From the Supreme Political Committee of the Emergency National Congress to the Democratic Assembly
1) Advisory Council of the USAMGIK
2) Supreme Political Committee of the Emergency National Congress
3) Transfer to the Democratic Assembly
3. The Interim Legislative Assembly of South Korea
1) Background of the Composition
2) Election and Composition
3) Activities
4) Dissolution: Road to the Constitutional Assembly
5) Evaluation
4. Conclusion

Part II. The Gestation of Tragedies

Chapter 9. The Genesis of the Korean Communists
1. Introduction
2. Inspiration of the Russian October Revolution and Eastern Policy of the Comintern
3. Conflict on the Front Line for the Liberation
4. The Deepening of Social Inequality
5. The Communization of Mainland China
6. The Jacobin Mentality of the Revolutionary Age
7. Personal Disposition
8. Conclusion

Chapter 10. Disputes on Trusteeship, 1945-1947
1. Introduction
2. Moscow Agreements and America's Device
3. Logic of the Anti-Trusteeship
4. Logic of the Pro-Trusteeship
5. The Reasons Why the Left-wing Changed to Pro-Trusteeship
1) Hypothesis I: Direction from Moscow
2) Hypothesis II: Decision by Themselves
3) Hypothesis III: Struggle for Hegemony
6. Conclusion

Chapter 11. U.S.-USSR Joint Commission, 1946-1947
1. Introduction
2. Preliminary Meeting (January 16-February 6, 1946)
3. First Conference (March 20-May 9, 1946)
4. Adjournments and Quests (May 10, 1946-May 20, 1947)
5. Second Conference (May 21-October 18, 1947)
6. Conclusion: Who was Responsible for the Breaking of the Joint Commission?

Chapter 12. Conflicts within the Right-Wing
―With a Focus upon the Relationship between Rhee Syng-man and Kim Koo
1. Introduction
2. Fatal Conflict: Differences of Social Status and School
3. Heterogeneity and Homogeneity of the Political Line
1) Bourgeoisie Democracy vs. Chauvinism
2) Pro-American Diplomacy vs. Terrorism
3) Confucian Authoritarianism vs. Equalitarianism
4) Anti-Russianism vs. Anti-Communism
4. Conflict in the Provisional Government
5. Conflict after the Liberation
1) The Purge of the Pro-Japanese Vestiges
2) Trusteeship Problem
3) Disputes on Establishment of a Separate Government in South Korea
6. Conclusion

Chapter 13. Conflicts within the Left-Wing
―The Case of Park Hun-young and Kim Il-sung
1. Introduction
2. Families and Political Orientation
1) Family
2) School
3) Activities under the Japanese Rule
3. Conflict of the Political Line
1) Class Struggle or United Front?
2) Vanguard or the Masses?
3) Conflict of the North Korean Branch of the Korean Communist Party
4) Conflict of the Left-Right Collaboration Movement
5) Choice of the USSR: Native Communist or Overseas Communist?
4. Conclusion

Chapter 14. The Fall of the Moderates
―The Case of Lyuh Woon-hyung
1. Introduction
2. Family and Political Orientation
3. A Historical View of the Liberation: The Preparatory Committee for Nation-Building (PCNB)
4. A View on the Military Government and Trusteeship: The People’s Republic of Korea
5. Response to and Conflict with the Provisional Government: Agony as a Leftist
6. Conflict and Frustration of the Tri-partite Merger
7. Standpoint at the U.S.-USSR Joint Commission
8. Conclusion

Chapter 15. The Left-Right Collaboration Movement, 1946
1. Introduction
2. Intentions of the United States
3. Intentions of Kim Kyu-shik
4. Intentions of Lyuh Woon-hyung
5. Intentions of the Rightists and Leftists
6. Progress of the Collaboration
7. Conclusion: Limitations of the Collaboration

Chapter 16. Negotiations for the Unification between South and North Korea, 1948
1. Introduction
2. Standpoints of Kim Koo and Kim Kyu-shik in 1948
3. Intention of North Korea and Progress of the Negotiation
4. Responses of Rhee Syng-man and the Military Government
5. Conclusion

Part III. The Descendants of Cain

Chapter 17. The Three Tragedies
―The Taegu Riot, Cheju Rebellion and Yusoo-Soonchun Military Insurrection
1. Introduction
2. The Taegu Riot
1) Taegu in 1946
2) How the Incident Developed
3) Its Legacy
3. Cheju Rebellion
1) The Political Heritages of Cheju Island and the Political Atmosphere in 1948
2) Development of the Incident
3) The Painful Internal Hemorrhage
4. The Yusoo-Soonchun Military Insurrection
1) The Political Atmosphere of Junnam Province
2) Character of the 14th Regiment
3) Development of the Incident
4) Its Legacy
5. Conclusion

Chapter 18. Withdrawal of the U.S. Army and the Transfer of Korean Problems to the UN, 1947-1949
1. Introduction
2. The Logic of Withdrawal
1) Korea's Lack of Strategic Value and the U.S. Strategy of Air Force Priority
2) Greater Significance Placed on European Countries than Asian Countries
3) Cold War Theory and Anti-war Sentiment in the United States
4) Rupture of the U.S.-USSR Joint Commission in 1947
3. Conflicts of Withdrawal
1) Apprehensions of the Communization of Korea and Defense of Japan
2) Conflicts between the Department of State and the Military
3) Political Significance of Korea
4. Progress of Withdrawal
1) The Third Alternative: Transfer of the Korean Problem to the UN
2) The Wedemeyer Report
3) Delay and Completion of Withdrawal
4) Aftermath of Withdrawal: McCarthyism
5. Conclusion

Chapter 19. The Origins of the Korean War (1)
―With Consideration of Dean Acheson’s Speech before the National Press Club
1. Introduction
2. The Process and Contents of Acheson’s Speech
3. Acheson’s Speech and His Responsibility for the Korean War: Several Hypotheses
1) First Hypothesis: Acheson Wanted to Relinquish the Korean Peninsula
2) Second Hypothesis: Acheson’s Speech was a Carefully Planned Conspiracy by Pentagon Hawks
3) Third Hypothesis: Acheson’s Speech was not Responsible for the Korean War
4. Acheson’s Idea and His Real Intention Concerning the Defense Perimeter
5. Conclusion

Chapter 20. The Origins of the Korean War (2)
―Kim Il-sung's Intention to Begin the War
1. Introduction
2. The Characteristics of the Korean War
3. The Scope of the Korean War
1) Why did the North Korean Army Concentrate Its Forces to Attack Seoul?
2) Why did the North Korean Army Stay in Seoul during the Critical Three Days at the Beginning of War?
3) Why did Kim Il-sung not Value an Attack on the East Coast?
4) Why did North Korea Attach Importance to Light Equipment?
5) Did Kim not Relly Anticipate the Intervention of the Unoted States?
4. Outbreak of War by Kim Il-sung and the Response of the United States
5. Confutation of the Responsibility of War in North Korea
6. Conclusion

Chapter 21. The Armistice Negotiations of the Korean War
1. Introduction
2. Interests of the Related States before the Armistice
1) Standpoint of the United States
2) Standpoint of the Communist China
3) Standpoint of the USSR
4) Standpoint of South Korea
5) Standpoint of North Korea
3. Progress of Secret Negotiations
1) Secret Negotiations between the U.S. and Communist China
2) Secret Negotiations between the U.S. and USSR
4. Beginning of the Armistice Negotiation, Stalemate and the Third Secret Negotiation
1) Stalemate of Negotiations
2) Dispatch of Secret Agents
3) The Last of the Secret Agents
5. Conclusion of the Armistice Agreement
6. Conclusion

Chapter 22. Conclusion
―Road to Unification
1. Prologue: Nationalism Comes Again
2. Several Myths of the Korean Unification
1) Myth I: ‘Our Aspiration is Unification’
2) Myth II: ‘North Korea Will Fall Soon’
3) Myth III: Populism
4) Myth IV: The Illusion of ‘Good America’
5) Myth V: Logic of the Cold War
3. Obstructions to Unification
1) Lack of Experience to Unify the State
2) The Monopoly of Financial Conglomerates in South Korea
3) Political Shutdown and Succession of Leadership in North Korea
4) Lack of Intention to Unify the Peninsula in the Governing
5) Heritages of Military Culture in South and North Korea
6) Immaturity of Negotiation Techniques
4. Conclusion

Bibliography
Index